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DESIGNING INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING: 
FACTS, ALTERNATIVE FACTS, AND NATIONAL 
IDENTITIES 
Shiri Krebs* 
“After every war 
someone has to clean up. 
Things won’t 
straighten themselves up, after all. 
… 
Those who knew 
what was going on here 
must make way to 
those who know little. 
And less than little. 
And finally as little as nothing. 
 
In the grass that has overgrown 
causes and effects, 
someone must be stretched out, 
blade of grass in his mouth, 
gazing at the clouds.”  
-Wislawa Szymborska, The End and the Beginning** 
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ABSTRACT 
One of the most certain facts about conflicts is uncertainty about 
facts. To establish the truth and find out what really happened, the 
international community has been sending fact-finding missions to 
conflict areas around the world. These missions have been designed 
to produce legal reports, based on binary legal dichotomies. This 
article builds on social psychology studies to argue that these 
missions’ reliance on abstract and adversarial legal norms triggers 
backlash and rejection of factual findings by the perpetrators’ 
societies. Instead of agreeing on a simple set of brute facts, such as 
the number of fatalities, or concrete causes of death, the focus of 
attention is shifted to abstract legal norms and to the threat they pose 
to collective beliefs and identities. Focusing on the U.N. Fact-Finding 
Mission on the Gaza Conflict as a case study, this article 
demonstrates how international efforts to provide conflicting societies 
with new, credible facts may instead end up intensifying the conflict 
over ‘what happened.’ Particularly, the article sheds light on several 
contemporary challenges to international fact-finding, including their 
factual contingency, their ambiguous goals and flawed institutional 
design processes, and their dissemination deficit. 
Based on an interdisciplinary normative framework and 
empirical analysis of the Goldstone Mission, the article suggests a 
new framework to design international fact-finding missions. First, 
the concept of truth should not be associated exclusively with legal 
truth, and facts should not be interpreted and evaluated based solely 
on legal categorization and interpretation; second, long-term goals 
should be carefully clarified, prioritized, and tailored to the concrete 
social circumstances; third, fact-finding processes should be matched 
with the mission’s core goal, with a special attention given to 
institutional structures, participation, and social legitimacy. Finally, 
in this era of constant challenges to knowledge and information, 
where ‘alternative facts’ are frequently produced to counter 
unwelcomed information, and when critical findings are denounced 
as ‘fake news’, international fact-finding missions should be sensitive 
to the various contingencies of their findings, and adopt a humbler 
approach concerning the ‘indisputable’ nature of these findings. By 
reimagining international fact-finding and rethinking their design 
processes, International fact-finding missions may contribute to 
dissemination of threatening information during intractable conflicts 
in a way which is unattainable by existing legal institutions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
How many Palestinian civilians were killed during Operation 
Cast Lead? Was the killing of twenty-one family members at the Al-
Samouni house an intentional targeting of civilians, or an unfortunate 
mistake based on erroneous intelligence? Were war crimes and crimes 
against humanity committed by Israel or Hamas (or both) during these 
twenty-two days in December 2008 and January 2009? These and 
many other questions concerning Operation Cast Lead have troubled 
many organizations and individuals around the world. Amnesty 
International urged the international community to intervene,1 Israeli 
human rights organizations called on the Israeli Government to halt 
the threat to civilians in Gaza,2 and various international 
organizations pressed the Security Council to ‘take action.’3 
The United Nations (“UN”) Human Rights Council decided to 
intervene: on January 12, 2009, while hostilities were still ongoing in 
Gaza, it established the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza 
Conflict (hereinafter the Goldstone Mission) to investigate violations 
of international law.4 After months of intensive work collecting 
evidence and hearing testimonies, the Goldstone Mission issued a 
detailed 452-page report.5 After recounting ‘factual findings,’ the 
                                                                                                                                  
1. Amnesty International Calls for an Immediate Humanitarian Truce in Gaza, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL (Jan. 7, 2009), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2009/01/amnesty-
international-calls-immediate-humanitarian-truce-gaza-20090107/ [https://perma.cc/87X5-
H52Y] (archived Dec. 31, 2017); End Unlawful Attacks and Meet Gaza’s Emergency Needs, 
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (Dec. 29, 2008), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news
/2008/12/end-unlawful-attacks-and-meet-gaza039s-emergency-needs-20081229/ 
[https://perma.cc/PD9U-CYH8] (archived Dec. 31, 2017). 
2. Donald Macintyre, Civilian Casualties: Human Rights Groups Accuse Israelis of War 
Crimes, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 15, 2009), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/civilian-casualties-human-rights-groups-accuse-israelis-of-war-crimes-1366727.html 
[https://perma.cc/LL6W-YASN] (archived Dec. 31, 2017). 
3. Press Release, Press Conference by Humanitarian, Human Rights Organizations on 
Gaza, UNITED NATIONS (Jan. 7, 2009), http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/090107_
Humanitarian.doc.htm [https://perma.cc/XN3C-CD9V] (archived Dec. 31, 2017). 
4. The Grave Violations of Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Particularly Due to the Recent Israeli Military Attacks against the Occupied Gaza Strip, 
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/S-9/L.1 (Jan. 12 2009), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G09/102/84/PDF/G0910284.pdf?OpenElement 
[https://perma.cc/6CMS-FQHA] (archived Dec. 31, 2017). 
5. Report of the Human Rights Council, Human Rights in Palestine and Other Occupied 
Arab Territories: Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/
bodies/hrcouncil/docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ5Q-S95E] (archived 
Jan. 18, 2018) [hereinafter the Goldstone Report]. 
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Report further described the Mission’s ‘legal findings,’ and concluded 
that some of the actions of the Government of Israel and of the 
Palestinian armed groups constitute war crimes and may amount to 
crimes against humanity.6 
The Jewish-Israeli public rejected the Report altogether as biased 
and unfounded.7 The Israeli Government contested the Report’s 
findings and issued its own alternative reports.8 The facts produced by 
the Israeli counter-reports stood in stark contradiction to the facts 
established by the Goldstone Report.9 Consequently, the Goldstone 
Report became, in itself, a part of the conflict.10 Soon enough, the 
Report sparked another debate concerning the legal standards to be 
applied by international fact-finding missions.11 But in spite of all the 
attention and the resources invested, and almost a decade later, to this 
                                                                                                                                  
6. Id. at 284, 417-19. 
7. An Israeli public opinion poll found that among Jewish-Israelis that were familiar with 
the report’s main conclusion, an overwhelming majority (93.5%) believed that the report was 
biased against Israel; and 79% rejected the finding that IDF soldiers committed war crimes. 
Data and questionnaires courtesy of the Guttman Center for Surveys at the Israel Democracy 
Institute (RA) and the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution at Tel Aviv 
University. See EPHRAIM YAAR & TAMAR HERMANN, WAR AND PEACE INDEX - SEPTEMBER 
2009 1 (2009), http://www.peaceindex.org/files/peaceindex2009_9_3.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9PQ9-WHRC] (archived Jan. 19, 2018). 
8. Initial Response to Report of the Fact-Finding Mission on Gaza Established Pursuant 
to Resolution S-9/1 of the Human Rights Council, ISRAELI MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(Sept. 24, 2009) http://mfa.gov.il/MFA_Graphics/MFA%20Gallery/Documents/Goldstone
ReportInitialResponse240909.pdf; Gaza Operation Investigations: An Update, ISRAELI 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Jan. 29, 2010), http://mfa.gov.il/MFA_Graphics
/MFA%20Gallery/Documents/GazaOperationInvestigationsUpdate.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3NPG-JJBB] (archived Dec. 31, 2017). 
9. With regard to several incidents described in the Goldstone Mission, the Israeli 
counter-report contained an opposing factual description of the events, specifically concerning 
the identification of various targets as military or civilian targets, the munition used, and the 
intent or knowledge of the commanders in the field. Compare Goldstone Report, supra note 5, 
at 199-201, and Israeli counter-report, supra note 8, at 41-44 (concerning the destruction of the 
El-Bader flour mill), with Goldstone Report, supra note 5, at 208-10, and Israeli counter-
report, supra note 8, at 37-38 (concerning the attack on the Namar Wells). 
10. Tom Farer, The Goldstone Report on the Gaza Conflict: An Agora, 16 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 139 (2010). See also Jerome Slater, The Attacks on the Goldstone Report, in 
THE GOLDSTONE REPORT: THE LEGACY OF THE LANDMARK INVESTIGATION OF THE GAZA 
CONFLICT 360-374, 360 (Adam Horowitz, et al. eds., 2011) (stating that the report “has been 
so relentlessly and bitterly attacked in Israel and the United States that it has become toxic.”). 
11. See, e.g, Abraham Bell, Critique of the Goldstone Report and Its Treatment of 
International Humanitarian Law 104 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 79 (2010); Laurie R. Blank, 
Finding Facts But Missing the Law: The Goldstone Report, Gaza and Lawfare 43 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 279 (2011); William A. Schabas, Gaza, Goldstone, and Lawfare 43 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 307 (2011); Michael N. Schmitt, Investigating Violations of International Law 
in Armed Conflict 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 31 (2011).  
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day we still don’t know for certain how many Palestinians were killed 
during Operation Cast Lead, and how many of them were unarmed 
civilians. Similarly, we do not know for sure whether some of the 
attacks described in the Report constituted war crimes or crimes 
against humanity, and if so, who was responsible for these crimes, 
and how similar incidents might be prevented in the future. 
In fact, similar incidents did take place not long after the 
Goldstone Report was published, and they continue to occur. For 
example, in the summer of 2014, another Israeli-Palestinian war took 
place in Gaza (Operation Protective Edge), and new factual and legal 
controversies immediately began to rage. The UN Human Rights 
Council (“UNHCR”) established a new commission of inquiry to 
investigate international law violations committed by Israel during the 
2014 Gaza war;12 Israelis and Palestinians have rounded up the 
Facebook and Twitter troops to fight this bitter public opinion battle 
over the perception of law and facts; international law scholars have 
published contrasting legal opinions concerning Israel Defense Forces 
(“IDF”) actions;13 and the Israeli media went so far as to name those 
lawyers defending IDF actions as “Legal Iron Dome.”14 Once again, 
the legal debates have taken over the discussions concerning what 
happened, serving as yet another weapon in the war for public 
support. 
This article argues that during intractable conflicts such as the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fact-finding missions which center their 
efforts – as the Goldstone Mission did – on legal questions, may 
trigger backlash and denial, encourage the production of alternative 
reports and factual accounts, and ultimately intensify the very 
controversies they were set to resolve. Specifically, I argue that the 
unnecessary focus of current international fact-finding mechanisms 
                                                                                                                                  
12. Human Rights Council Res. S-21/1, (July 23, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/
EN/HRBodies/HRC/SpecialSessions/Session21/Pages/21stSpecialSession.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/YMN6-5QQQ] (archived Dec. 31, 2017). 
13. AVI BELL, ISRAEL MAY STOP SUPPLYING WATER AND ELECTRICITY TO GAZA (July 
24, 2014), http://en.kohelet.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/israel-may-stop-supplying-
water-and-electricity-to-Gaza-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7J9-VMBA] (archived Dec. 31, 
2017); Yuval Shany et. al., Legal Opinion Concerning Supply of Electricity and Water to the 
Gaza Strip (July 20, 2014), http://gisha.org/UserFiles/File/publications/letters/letter-en-20-7-
14.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV5J-UW8G] (archived Dec. 31, 2017). 
14. ‘Iron Dome’ is the missile defense system that protects Israeli cities from Palestinian 
rockets. See Gilad Grossman, Legal Iron Dome, WALLA! NEWS (Nov. 18, 2012), 
http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/1/2587639 [https://perma.cc/J77Q-SA9A] (archived Jan. 18, 
2018).  
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(including the Goldstone Mission) on the ‘legal truth’15 triggers 
various socio-psychological biases, which impede efforts to 
disseminate information. The abstract nature of legal norms creates a 
psychological distance between the facts and their audience, thus 
making it easier to reject the findings altogether. The adversarial 
nature of legal norms, leading to mutually exclusive conclusions, 
motivates conflicting societies to completely reject information that 
deviates from the national narrative. As a result, the adoption of 
dichotomous legal categories may unintentionally intensify distortion 
(rather than assertion) of facts. 
 The article begins, in Part II, by identifying several 
contemporary challenges to international fact-finding, including the 
contingency of their findings, the ambiguity of their goals, and their 
dissemination deficit. Part III explores various socio-psychological 
processes and dynamics affecting the dissemination of information 
during armed conflicts. Part IV applies this interdisciplinary 
theoretical framework to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and sheds 
light on the concrete socio-psychological barriers to fact-finding, 
faced by the Goldstone Mission. Finally, Part V suggests some 
possible directions for a positive change in the design and 
implementation of international fact-finding missions. 
II. INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING: CONTEMPORARY 
CHALLENGES 
From Palestine to Syria, to Afghanistan and Iraq; from Ukraine 
to Chechnya, to Serbia, to Congo: one of the most certain facts about 
conflicts is uncertainty about facts.16 The disagreement about facts 
may include the history and roots of the conflict, as well as details 
concerning ongoing hostilities. Many times, disputes over facts 
                                                                                                                                  
15. ‘Legal truth’ refers to the adoption of legal categories to construct and interpret facts. 
See Shiri Krebs, The Legalization of Truth in International Fact Finding, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
83, 92-93 (2017). See also, Jack M. Balkin, The Proliferation of Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 5, 6 (2003); Michael S. Moore, The Plain Truth about Legal Truth, 26 HARV. J. L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 23, 25 (2003). 
16. Bothe, for example, highlights the importance of ascertaining facts in a variety of 
conflicts, be they of a social, political or legal character. See Michael Bothe, Fact-Finding as a 
Means of Ensuring Respect for International Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW FACING NEW CHALLENGES 249-67 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & 
Volker Epping eds., 2007). 
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become so intense they nourish and intensify the conflict,17 and thus 
pave the way to reoccurrence of crimes and abuses.18 
To resolve such controversies and determine “what happened,” 
international organizations (including UN bodies, such as the Office 
of the Secretary-General and the Human Rights Council) have 
increasingly employed international commissions of inquiry or fact-
finding missions.19 These missions serve as a way to ascertain facts 
by way of gathering immediate, credible, and first-hand 
information,20 based on rigorous methodology,21 adequate 
recourses,22 and qualified personnel.23 
In recent decades, there has been a tremendous increase in the 
number of fact-finding institutions, as well as increasing variety in 
their mandates and establishing bodies.24 Nonetheless, many of these 
international fact-finding missions share two common structures: the 
                                                                                                                                  
17. For an elaborated discussion on the disagreement on facts as a socio-psychological 
barrier to conflict resolution, see Suzanne Retzinger & Thomas Scheff, Emotion, Alienation, 
and Narratives: Resolving Intractable Conflict, 18 MEDIATION Q. 71-85 (2000); Peter T. 
Coleman, Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Toward the Development of a 
Metaframework-I, 9 PEACE & CONFLICT: J. PEACE PSYCHOL. 1, 19 (2003). 
18. For a comprehensive analysis of preservation of conflicting narratives and beliefs in 
intractable conflict, see Daniel Bar-Tal, Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable 
Conflicts, 50 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1430 (2007). See also Neta Oren & Daniel Bar-Tal, The 
Detrimental Dynamics of Delegitimization in Intractable Conflicts: The Israeli-Palestinian 
Case, 31 INT’L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 111 (2007). 
19. Krebs, supra note 15, at 94-95. 
20. See generally H. VICTOR CONDÉ, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
TERMINOLOGY 88, 127 (2004); Bertrand G. Ramcharan, Introductionto INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2013); see also G.A. Res. 46/49 (Dec. 
9, 1991). 
21. Diane F Orentlicher, Bearing Witness: The Art and Science of Human Rights Fact-
Finding, 3 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 83, 85 (1990); see generally Théo Boutruche, Credible Fact-
Finding and Allegations of International Humanitarian Law Violations: Challenges in Theory 
and Practice, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 105 (2011). 
22. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Appraising UN Justice-Related Fact-Finding Missions, 5 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 35, 42 (2001). 
23. Bertrand G. Ramcharan, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 42. Indeed, fact-finding efforts in a variety of contexts 
“requires one to perfect strategies for information gathering, interpersonal communication, and 
analysis of both the legal and non-legal dimensions of a particular socio-legal problem.” 
Johanna Bond, The Global Classroom: International Human Rights Fact-Finding as Clinical 
Method, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 317, 328 (2001). 
24. For a brief overview of fact-finding mechanisms established by the international 
community since 1913, see Rob Grace & Claude Bruderlein, Building Effective Monitoring, 
Reporting, and Fact-finding Mechanisms 3-9 (Program on Humanitarian Pol’y and Conflict 
Res., Harv. Univ. Working Paper, 2012). 
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lack of compulsory jurisdiction or enforcement capacity;25 and the 
adoption of legal categories (such as war crimes and crimes against 
humanity) to interpret the facts and infuse meaning into their 
findings.26 The combination of these common structures of 
international fact-finding mechanisms separates them from other 
accountability mechanisms (such as international tribunals), and 
generates several challenges for the production and dissemination of 
fact-finding reports. The next Sections will focus on three of these 
challenges to international fact-finding missions, including the 
contingency of their findings, the ambiguity of their goals, and their 
dissemination deficit. 
A. Factual Contingency 
What are facts for the purposes of international fact-finding 
missions? What types of facts are to be included in the fact-fining 
process? Should all types of facts be treated equally, using the same 
methodology and subject to the same burden of proof? In fact, during 
fact-finding processes various types of facts are collected, produced 
and interpreted. Some facts are brute or physical facts, for example, 
the number of fatalities or weapons’ remains found at the scene; other 
facts are inferences and predictions, such as risk assessments or 
anticipated levels of threat; value-judgments, such as the 
excessiveness of harm, represent yet another kind of fact; and lastly, 
there are legal facts or legal interpretations, which include 
categorizing an individual as a ‘civilian,’ or determining that a certain 
behavior constitutes a crime. Each of these types of facts presents a 
different challenge with regard to fact-finding processes, appropriate 
methodologies, and burdens of proof. 
Nonetheless, fact-finders in a variety of legal contexts often 
disregard the unique empirical challenges raised by each type of fact, 
and adopt similar processes to obtain and interpret facts.27 The 
                                                                                                                                  
25. Geoffrey Palmer, Reform of UN Inquiries, in FOR THE SAKE OF FUTURE 
GENERATIONS-ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, CRIME JUSTICE IN HONOUR OF ROGER S. 
CLARK 597, 610-615 (2015). 
26. In another study, I compiled a data set of UN fact-finding missions throughout the 
years, and analyzed their mandates and goals, finding that a large majority were tasked with 
promoting legal accountability based on legal categories and interpretation. See Krebs, supra 
note 15, at 94-96. 
27. Michael D. Risinger, Searching for Truth in the American Law of Evidence and 
Proof, 47 GA. LAW REV. 801 (2013); see, also Michael S. Moore, The Plain Truth about Legal 
Truth, 26 HARVARD J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 24-26 (2003) (distinguishing between propositions 
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Goldstone Mission, for example, adopted an “inclusive approach to 
gathering information and seeking views” and held public hearings 
which “covered facts as well as legal and military matters.”28 In 
establishing its findings, the Goldstone Mission referred to objective 
and subjective elements of the crimes in question, yet clarified that its 
findings did not reach the standard of proof applicable in criminal 
trials.29 The Goldstone Mission did not elucidate which standard of 
proof was adopted instead. Similarly to many other fact-finding 
bodies, the Goldstone Mission entertained the idea that a “[fact-
finding] report speaks for itself.”30 However, the facts produced by 
fact-finding missions almost never speak for themselves; rather, 
                                                                                                                                  
of fact, general law, interpretation, value, and logic). Instead, facts have been treated as 
objects, waiting to be ‘found’ through a neutral process of fact-finding. Kim Lane Scheppele, 
Just the Facts, Ma’am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of Truth, 37 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123, 125-26 (1992). 
28. The Goldstone Report, supra note 5, at 15. 
29. Id. at 16 (clarifying that its findings do not attempt to identify the individuals 
responsible for the commission of offences). 
30. In a press conference following the release of the Goldstone Report, Justice 
Goldstone expressly stated that “the report speaks for itself” in documenting crimes committed 
by both Israel and Hamas. Human Rights Council, Unofficial transcript of 29 September 2009 
Press Conference at the Palais des Nations in Geneva by Members of the UN Fact Finding 
Mission on the Gaza Conflict - Justice Richard Goldstone, Hina Jilani, Professor Christine 
Chinkin, Colonel Desmond Travers, at 7 (Sept. 29, 2009) http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
HRBodies/HRC/SpecialSessions/Session9/Pages/FactFindingMission.aspx. Former UN 
Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, opined, similarly, that “the facts speak for themselves,” 
while referring to the findings of the UN Commission of Inquiry that “[Syrian] Government 
and pro-government forces have committed murder, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial 
executions, rape and torture against civilians,” and determining that these actions and the use 
of chemical weapons by Syrian forces amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
United Nations Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council on the report of the 
United Nations Missions to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons on the 
incident that occurred on 21 August 2013 in the Ghouta area of Damascus, UNITED NATIONS 
SEC’Y GEN., (Sept. 16, 2013), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2013-09-
16/secretary-generals-remarks-security-council-report-united-nations [https://perma.cc/PGV6-
U7X5] (archived Dec. 31, 2017). Also, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented 
the report of the fact-finding mission to Iraq to the UN Security Council by stating that “the 
report of the fact-finding mission speaks for itself.” U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Feb. 
23, 2004 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, U.C. Doc. 
S/2004/140 (Feb. 23, 2004), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=
S/2004/140 [https://perma.cc/PU6T-9AKL] (archived Jan. 19, 2017); see also The Facts Speak 
for Themselves: The Preliminary Report on Disappearances of the National Commissioner for 
the Protection of Human Rights in Honduras, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 1, 1994), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/1994/07/01/facts-speak-themselves/preliminary-report-
disappearances-national-commissioner [https://perma.cc/KG5L-62RD] (archived Dec. 31, 
2017); Rob Grace, Communication and Report Drafting in Monitoring, Reporting, and Fact-
finding Mechanisms 13, 53 (Program on Humanitarian Pol’y and Conflict Res., Harv. Univ. 
Working Paper, 2014). 
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various institutional and design choices speak for them. Specifically, 
the decision to adopt legal categories to interpret the facts, produces a 
contingent version of reality, as it adheres to legal rules and processes 
that frame the story, infuse it with meaning, and dictate how the 
relevant facts are construed. 
Ontologically, law provides norms and rules that construct 
reality in a specific manner, and this legal reality or legal truth may 
differ from non-legal constructions of reality.31 Terms such as 
‘genocide,’ ‘civilian,’ ‘terrorist,’ ‘torture,’ or even ‘responsibility’ 
have unique meanings as legal terms, and potentially other meanings 
outside the law, within political, ethical, or moral discourses. When 
we adopt legal categories to interpret reality and determine the truth, 
the findings relate to the legal reality, which may be very different 
from the moral, ethical, or political interpretation of reality.32 For 
example, a finding that 764 Palestinian civilians were killed by Israeli 
security forces during operation cast lead depends on the 
interpretation of the legal category ‘civilians.’33 Applying a moral or 
ethical interpretation, a political interpretation, or even a different 
legal interpretation – may dramatically change our findings 
concerning the number of civilians killed. Additionally, legal 
categories are often dichotomous, coercing complex reality into 
simplified categories such as ‘combatant’ or ‘civilian,’ ‘lawful,’ or 
‘unlawful.’ The categorization itself forces meaning onto the facts, 
and simplifies compound and nuanced representations.34 
                                                                                                                                  
31. See Michael S. Moore, Legal reality: A naturalist approach to legal ontology, 21 
LAW & PHIL. 619, 628 (2002) (“we thus can expect no precision in how to combine the very 
general moral, historical, scientific, and semantic facts that make a legal interpretation 
correct.”); Balkin, supra note 15, at 7 (“law’s truth is not the only truth, and law’s vision of 
reality is not the only reality.”) 
32. See Balkin, supra note 15, at 7 (arguing that law’s power to enforce its vision of the 
world can clash with other practices of knowledge, and with other forms of truth). 
33. This indeed raised heated controversies following the release of the Goldstone 
Report, especially concerning the appropriate legal categorization of the 248 Palestinian police 
officers who were killed by Israeli forces at the outset of the war. See, e.g., Michael N. 
Schmitt, Military necessity and humanity in international humanitarian law: preserving the 
delicate balance, in ESSAYS ON LAW AND WAR AT THE FAULT LINES 89, 116 (2011); see also 
Israel/Gaza: Civilians Must Not Be Targets, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 30, 2009), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/12/30/israel/gaza-civilians-must-not-be-targets 
[https://perma.cc/RZH4-CZPV] (archived Dec. 31, 2017); Israel’s Gaza Toll Far Lower Than 
Palestinian Tally, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLQ977827 
[https://perma.cc/3XCZ-WK5M] (archived Jan. 20, 2018). 
34. Sherwin explores, more generally, the clash between law’s demand for truth and 
justice and the modem mind’s demand for closure and certainty, leading lawyers and processes 
of adjudication to simplify reality, by leaving the ‘messy things’ out. See generally Richard K. 
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Epistemologically, legal categories limit and define what is 
considered ‘true’ in various ways. First, legal conventions, 
jurisdiction and rules of evidence join in to carve the boundaries of 
the story they tell, by limiting the universe of facts that are included in 
the legal account of ‘what happened.’ Rooted rules of admissibility 
may serve to exclude various facts from the fact-finding process, even 
if they do not formally apply. For example, it is often the case that 
only facts that are specifically relevant to answering the legal question 
- such as causes of death or intent of the perpetrator - are included. 
Other facts, relating, for example, to the more distant roots of the 
conflict, broader social processes of dehumanization, or acts 
committed outside the temporal or geographical jurisdiction of the 
fact-finding body - are excluded.35 Second, legal epistemology further 
restructures the story by determining the weight and reliability of the 
relevant facts. Legal rules determine the value and strength of the 
information collected, preferring some facts over others. 
While many of these rules are designed to promote an accurate 
account of events,36 they nonetheless represent a deliberate choice 
concerning how to construct reality. Moreover, some rules of 
evidence depart from the goal of ascertaining the truth and favor other 
purposes, such as protecting national security, deterring police 
misconduct, or even controlling the direction of errors. These rules 
determine how facts should be treated and interpreted, what the 
required burden of proof is, and which evidence should be suppressed 
(because it is considered hearsay, because the information is 
privileged, because it was obtained unlawfully, or because of several 
other reasons). Either way, law requires us to determine ‘what 
happened’ while ignoring important facts that describe some aspects 
of the events in question. 
Ultimately, facts collected to answer a legal question, based on 
legal categories, are not neutral or natural; rather, they create a 
contingent description of certain events. As Jack Balkin pointed out, 
“law’s truth is not the only truth, and law’s vision of reality is not the 
                                                                                                                                  
Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN. 
L. REV. 39, 40-41 (1994). 
35. Sara Kendall & Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Speaking of Legacy: Toward an Ethos of 
Modesty at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 212, 223 
(2016) (“Historical accounts produced through international criminal trials are notoriously 
incomplete”). 
36. See Fed. R. Evid. 102. 
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only reality.”37 There are many other forms of knowledge acquisition 
in the world, and many other conventions through which people 
assess information and determine what is true or false.38 In this era of 
constant challenges to knowledge and information, where ‘alternative 
facts’ are frequently produced to counter unwelcomed information, 
and when critical findings are denounced as ‘fake news’, the outputs 
of international fact-finding missions are particularly sensitive to 
competing findings. Therefore, international fact-finding missions 
should be sensitive to the various contingencies of their findings, and 
adopt a humbler approach concerning the ‘indisputable’ nature of 
these findings. As fact-finding reports do not speak for themselves, it 
is imperative that fact-finding missions would carefully choose the 
voice that speaks for them. 
B. Goal Ambiguity 
‘Ascertaining facts’ is a core purpose of any fact-finding body. 
Nonetheless, it is usually not the only, or even the main, goal of 
international fact-finding. Typically, international organizations 
invest a great deal of resources in fact-finding efforts in order to 
utilize the ascertained facts for a further purpose. Throughout the 
years, international fact-finding missions (or commissions of inquiry) 
have been established to promote a variety of goals, such as 
promoting accountability, preventing future atrocities, facilitating 
reconciliation or advancing peaceful resolution of international 
conflicts.39 These different purposes dictate a variety of fact-finding 
methods, processes and tools, as well as diverse authorities, mandates 
and jurisdictions. 
In spite of this potential diversity both in goals and in processes, 
international fact-finding has been increasingly used by the 
international community within a narrow legalistic context. In the past 
few decades, international fact-finding missions have become a 
                                                                                                                                  
37. Balkin, supra note 15, at 7; see also RICHARD A. WILSON, WRITING HISTORY IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 9 (2011) (“Because courts follow law’s own exceptional 
principles rather than those of historical inquiry, they can reduce complex histories to a 
defective legal template, and thereby distort history.”). 
38. See Balkin, supra note 15, at 11. 
39. See Erin Daly, Truth skepticism: An inquiry into the value of truth in times of 
transition, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 23, 24 (2008); Krebs, supra note 15, at 95-97; see 
generally Boutruche, supra note 21; Edwin Brown Firmage, Fact-Finding in the Resolution of 
International Disputes - From the Hague Peace Conference to the United Nations, 1971 UTAH 
L. REV. 421; Orentlicher, supra note 21. 
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dominant method to ensure the implementation of and to promote 
respect for international law, mainly international human rights law 
(“IHR”) and international humanitarian law (“IHL”).40 Similarly, 
most of the relevant literature on international fact-finding missions 
have focused on the legal aspects of international fact-finding: the 
required standard of proof to assign responsibility; the gravity 
threshold of violations to be considered by a fact-finding body; and 
the implementation, interpretation and enforcement of IHL and 
HRL.41 The long-term goals of fact-finding in this context have been 
to promote legal accountability and to establish a basis for national or 
international adjudication processes. Nonetheless, the mandates of 
these international fact-finding missions have often failed to identify, 
clarify, and prioritize the core goals of the missions. 
This goal ambiguity is problematic due to several reasons. First, 
it hinders attempts to clarify policy direction ex ante, and to assess the 
missions’ success ex post.42 Second, it prevents a more thoughtful 
design process, which would enable tailoring appropriate processes to 
the specified goals. For example, the goal of promoting legal 
accountability requires access to evidence and witnesses, resting on 
either voluntary or compulsory cooperation. Third, it diminishes the 
significance of finding facts for the sake of establishing truth(s). The 
focus on legal questions suggests that fact-finding is meaningless 
without a legal interpretation of the facts, and that some vague form 
of legal accountability is more important than creating a historical 
record or promoting a dual-narrative rather than an adversarial legal 
truth. 
                                                                                                                                  
40. See generally Boutruche, supra note 21, at 107-08; Krebs, supra note 15, at 94-95; 
Orentlicher, supra note 21, at 83-85. 
41. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: REVISED AND EDITED REPRINT (Bertrand G. Ramcharan ed., 2014); Michael Bothe, 
supra note 16, at 249; Grace & Bruderlein, supra note 24, at 31. See generally Boutruche, 
supra note 21; Orentlicher, supra note 21, at 85. .Until recently, the political, moral, ethical, 
and social aspects of international fact-finding have been rarely dealt with. An important 
contribution in this regard is THE TRANSFORMATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS FACT-FINDING (Philip 
Alston & Sarah Knuckey eds., 2016), which raises political, moral and critical aspects of the 
practice of fact-finding. 
42. Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems 
Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123 (2009), at 129-130.  
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C. Dissemination of Information 
In his oral remarks from March 22, 2016, Christof Heyns, UN 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions 
and member of the UN Independent Investigation on Burundi, stated 
that “it is crucial to ascertain the disputed facts in an indisputable 
manner.”43 Similarly, international tribunals, such as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, have emphasized their 
roles in creating indisputable and undeniable historical records of 
otherwise controversial wartime events.44 Nonetheless, it is evident 
that denialism is still thriving, in the former Yugoslavia and 
elsewhere.45 Indeed, it is often the case that fact-finding reports fail to 
resolve the very controversies they were sent to investigate, and may 
even intensify them.46 For example, the Rwandan Government 
rejected the 2010 Democratic Republic of the Congo Report and 
named it “dangerous and irresponsible”;47 the Israeli Government 
                                                                                                                                  
43. Oral update by Christof Heyns, U.N. Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary 
or arbitrary executions, Member of the United Nations Independent Investigation on Burundi 
(UNIIB), on the Enhanced Interactive Dialogue on Burundi, Human Rights Council (Mar. 22, 
2016), http://www.refworld.org/docid/5728500c4.html.  
44. See Achievements, U.N. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/achievements [https://perma.cc/BPM7-
JX6J] (last visited Dec. 31, 2017); Sara Kendall and Sarah MH Nouwen, supra note 35, at 216 
(2016) (citing Judge Dennis Byron’s Address to the UN General Assembly, ICTR 
NEWSLETTER 1 (Oct. 2008), http://www.unmict.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/
news/newsletters/oct08.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8T9-234N] (archived Dec. 31, 2017)). 
45. Marko Milanovic, The Impact of the ICTY on the Former Yugoslavia: An 
Anticipatory Post-Mortem, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 233, 235 (2016). While similar public opinion 
data from Rwanda is not available, the prosecutions brought against ‘genocide deniers’ and the 
many laws recently enacted to prevent denialism, may demonstrate that the phenomenon 
persists. See generally Yakaré-Oulé (Nani) Jansen, Denying Genocide or Denying Free 
Speech? A Case Study of the Application of Rwanda’s Genocide Denial Laws, 12 NW. J. INT’L 
HUM. RTS. 191 (2014); Filip Reyntjens, Constructing the Truth, Dealing with Dissent, 
Domesticating the World: Governance in Post-genocide Rwanda, 110 AFR. AFF. 1 (2011). 
46. Alston et al., supra note 41, at 3. In a recent UN publication, the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights welcomed such controversies as “publicity,” and argued that they increase 
the public profile of the investigations and thus highlight the important role of the 
investigations in promoting accountability.  U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, 
Commissions of Inquiry and Fact-Finding Missions on International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law: Guidance and Practice, at 7, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/14/7 (2015), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/CoI_Guidance_and_Practice.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/43VC-9VP5] (archived Dec. 31, 2017). 
47. Statement by the Government of Rwanda on Leaked Draft UN Report on DRC, 
RWANDA NEWS AGENCY (Aug. 27, 2010), http://rnanews.com/politics/4080-statement-by-the-
government-of-rwanda-on-leaked-draft-un-report-on-drc [https://perma.cc/EX9H-FGZD] 
(archived Dec. 31, 2017). 
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fought against the 2009 Goldstone Report and insisted that it was 
“false and distorted,”48 while an overwhelming majority of Jewish-
Israelis opined that the Report was biased and untrustworthy;49 and 
the UN High Commissioner for Human rights criticized the Sri 
Lankan Government’s attacks on the integrity of the UN fact-finding 
mission on Sri Lanka, referring to it as a “continuing campaign of 
distortion and disinformation.”50 
Nonetheless, the resources that international organizations 
devote to compiling fact-finding reports are not matched by attention 
to how reports are disseminated or what impact they might have on 
their target audiences.51 Little attention (if any) has been given thus 
far to their effect on communal attitudes and beliefs and public 
opinion in affected communities.52 As evidence of backlash and 
denial mount, international fact-finding bodies should devote 
significant attention to the dissemination of their findings to a variety 
of audiences. Creating a historical record and mitigating controversy 
and denial cannot be achieved by simply releasing fact-finding 
reports. The processes and structures adopted to document abuses 
inevitably influence how well reports navigate the obstacles to 
successful dissemination of information and, ultimately, their 
persuasive power. The next Part will discuss a variety of socio-
psychological biases that may hinder the dissemination of fact-finding 
reports, and frustrate efforts to resolve factual controversies and 
create a shared historical record. 
                                                                                                                                  
48. Barak: Goldstone Report “False, Distorted, and Irresponsible,” HAARETZ (Jan. 28, 
2010), http://www.haaretz.com/news/barak-goldstone-report-false-distorted-and-irresponsible-
1.265821 [https://perma.cc/YFV6-K2XC] (archived Dec. 31, 2017). 
49. Following the release of the 2009 Goldstone Report, an Israeli public opinion poll 
found that 93.5% of Jewish Israelis believed the report was biased against Israel. See Yaar et 
al., supra note 7. For a more elaborate discussion of Israeli reaction to the Goldstone Report 
see infra Section IV.D. 
50. Zeid condemns persistent disinformation designed to discredit UN investigation on 
Sri Lanka, UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15263 
[https://perma.cc/ZP5G-JY33] (archived Dec. 31, 2017). 
51. Stanley Cohen, Government Responses to Human Rights Reports: Claims, Denials, 
and Counterclaims, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 517, 518 (1996). 
52. Alston and Knuckey, supra note 41, at 4. 
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III. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO INTERNATIONAL 
FACT-FINDING DURING INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS 
Every intractable conflict is intractable in its own way.53 Yet all 
intractable conflicts share a common source of their intractability, in 
the form of resistance to information that deviates from core social 
beliefs and narratives.54 This Part discusses the socio-psychological 
barriers to the dissemination of fact-finding reports in the context of 
intractable conflicts, shedding light on some of the processes which 
compromise social receptiveness to fact-finding reports. These 
include a variety of socio-psychological dynamics, including 
cognitive consistency and biased assimilation of new information,55 
confirmation bias, 56 motivated cognition,57 and collective memories 
and beliefs,58 which may trigger distortion or rejection of threatening 
                                                                                                                                  
53. “Happy families are all alike, every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” LEO 
TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA (1980). For a discussion of persistent conflicts and their 
intractability, see generally Peter T. Coleman et al, Intractable conflict as an attractor: A 
dynamical systems approach to conflict escalation and intractability, 50 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 1454 (2007). 
54. Coleman, supra note 17, at 6. 
55. According to cognitive consistency theories, human cognition is substantially 
affected by mutual interaction among pieces of psychological knowledge. Mounting evidence 
further demonstrates processes of biased assimilation of new information, meaning, people 
tend to interpret subsequent evidence so as to maintain their initial beliefs. Charles Lord, Lee 
Ross, and Mark Leper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior 
Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 
(1979); D. Simon, C.J. Snow, and S.J. Read, The Redux of Cognitive Consistency Theories: 
Evidence Judgments by Constraint Satisfaction, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 814 
(2004). 
56. Confirmation bias connotes the seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are 
partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or hypothesis in hand. See Raymond S. Nickerson, 
Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 
(1998). 
57. Kunda explains that a motivation to arrive at particular conclusions may affect 
reasoning through reliance on a biased set of cognitive processes (strategies for accessing, 
constructing, and evaluating beliefs) that are considered most likely to yield the desired 
conclusion. There is considerable evidence that people are more likely to arrive at conclusions 
that they want to arrive at, but their ability to do so is constrained by their ability to construct 
seemingly reasonable justifications for these conclusions. Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated 
Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990). 
58. Societal beliefs and collective memories are cognitions shared by society members 
on topics and issues that are of special concern for the particular society, and which contribute 
to the sense of uniqueness of the society’s members. Daniel Bar-Tal, Societal Beliefs in Times 
of Intractable Conflict: The Israeli Case, 9 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 22, 25-26 (1998); 
Daniel Bar-Tal, Collective Memory of Physical Violence: its Contribution to the Culture of 
Violence, in THE ROLE OF MEMORY IN ETHNIC CONFLICT 77 (Ed Cairns & Michael D. Roe 
eds., 2003). 
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information. Generally, the construction and evaluation of 
information in social settings is influenced by prior beliefs, ideologies 
and interests,59 as well as group identities and commitments.60 
These processes become more pronounced in the context of 
intractable conflicts, which are broadly defined as “conflicts that are 
recalcitrant, intense, deadlocked, and extremely difficult to resolve.”61 
Each intractable conflict can differ by level of importance (from 
superficial to existential concerns), centrality (to one’s identity, 
esteem, and sense of reality), pervasiveness (number of 
interconnections with other conflicts and experiences), and duration.62 
Importantly, each of the disputing groups develops a dominant 
narrative, emphasizing the “objective” goodness of one side’s claims 
over the other side’s claims. As a result, contradictory narratives 
emerge for each of the disputing groups and become promoted to 
unquestioned fact or truth.63 It is principally this subjective process of 
perception and interpretation, which drives reactions and behaviors 
and generates resistance to more nuanced information, which deviates 
from each group’s narrative.64 
The following Sections focus specifically on the dynamic of 
threatened social identities during intractable armed conflicts, and 
explain how fact-finding processes may frustrate efforts to 
disseminate information that is inconsistent with national narratives 
and core societal beliefs. Afterwards, this socio-psychological 
framework will be used to explain some of the backlash against the 
Goldstone Report expressed by the Jewish-Israeli society. 
                                                                                                                                  
59. Ifat Maoz et al., Reactive Devaluation of an “Israeli” vs. “Palestinian” Peace 
Proposal, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 515, 543 (2002). 
60. Dan M. Kahan et al., They Saw a Protest: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-
Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851 (2012); see also: LYNN EDEN, WHOLE WORLD ON 
FIRE: ORGANIZATIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESTRUCTION 37–60 (2004). 
61. Coleman, supra note 17, at 6. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 19; see also Daniel Bar-Tal and Gavriel Salomon, Narratives of the Israeli-
Palestinian Conflict: Evolvement, Contents, Functions and Consequences, in ISRAELI AND 
PALESTINIAN NARRATIVES OF CONFLICT: HISTORY’S DOUBLE HELIX 19 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 
2006); Barbara Tint, History, memory, and intractable conflict 27 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 239 
(2010). 
64. Coleman, supra note 17, at 19. 
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A. Social Identities 
Identity is an individual’s sense of self, of being a human 
agent.65 It is a product of self-consciousness, a process in which a 
person or a group possesses distinct qualities as an entity, which 
differentiates him or her from others.66 An important component of an 
individual’s identity is his or her social identity, which captures the 
individual’s knowledge that she belongs to certain social groups, 
together with some emotional significance to her of these group 
memberships.67 To enhance their social identities, individuals tend to 
behave in ways that make their own group acquire positive 
distinctiveness in comparison to other groups.68 
An individual’s social identity is composed of multiple identities 
based on social classifications.69 These may include familial, 
territorial, class, religious, ethnic, gender, and national classifications. 
National identity is a social identity based on elements such as 
historic territory or homeland; common myths and historical 
memories; common mass public culture; and common legal rights and 
duties for all the members of the community.70 Unlike a state, which 
refers exclusively to public institutions relating to the monopoly of 
coercion within a given territory, a nation signifies a bond that is both 
cultural and political, uniting in a single political community all who 
share a historic culture and homeland.71 
The most salient political function of national identity is its 
legitimization of legal institutions that define the values and character 
                                                                                                                                  
65. CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 
3 (1989). 
66. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE?: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA’S 
NATIONAL IDENTITY 21 (2004). 
67. John C. Turner, Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group, in SOCIAL 
IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 15, 18 (Henri Tajfel ed., 1982). 
68. Ed Cairns, Intergroup Conflict in Northern Ireland, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND 
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 277, 278 (Henri Tajfel ed., 1982); Huntington, supra note 66, at 25. 
69. ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY 4 (1991); Jan. E. Stets & Peter J. Burke, 
Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory, 63 SOCIAL PSYCHOL. Q. 224, 225 (2000). 
70. Smith, supra note 69, at 14; see alsoAnna Triandafyllidou, National Identity and the 
‘Other’, 21 ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 593, 599 (1998) (emphasizing the notion of the 
others as an inherent characteristic of nationalism and national identity); BENEDICT 
ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 6 (2006). 
71. Smith, supra note 69, at 14-15. Blum further analyzes the relations between nations 
and states, and discusses the applications of identity theory on both the relations between 
citizens and their state, and between sovereign states. See WILLIAM BLUM, PERSONAL 
IDENTITY, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1-5 (1990). 
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of the nation and reflect the customs of the people.72 Therefore, the 
appeal to national identity has become the main legitimization for 
social order and solidarity.73 Additionally, national identity serves as 
a tool for the socialization of group members as nationals and 
citizens, through compulsory, standardized, public, mass education 
systems.74 By using state-controlled primary education, state-
organized propaganda, official rewriting of history, and militarism, 
the national identity is affirmed and reaffirmed by political 
institutions.75 As a result, Smith finds that these systems enable state 
authorities to inculcate national devotion and a distinctive, 
homogeneous culture.76 Furthermore, by the use of symbols such as 
flags, anthems, uniforms, monuments, and ceremonies, group 
members are reminded of their common heritage and cultural kinship, 
and their sense of belonging is enhanced.77 
B. Societal Beliefs, Collective Memory, and Ethos of Conflict 
History is highly contextual, defined by social psychological 
processes and constructed by collective memories and beliefs.78 
Understanding memory as a group, rather than individual, 
phenomenon, highlights its contextual and collective dimension, as 
well as the institutional processes and techniques used to create, 
reinforce and commemorate it.79 Tint mentions various such 
techniques, including selective omission, fabrication, exaggeration 
and embellishment, implication of causal linkages, blaming the 
enemy, and reframing contextual factors.80   
According to Bar-Tal, societal beliefs, which are shared by the 
majority of the society members, define cues for the interpretation 
and evaluation of information.81 In the context of intractable conflicts, 
                                                                                                                                  
72. Smith, supra note 69, at 16. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Anderson, supra note 70, at 104. 
76. Smith, supra note 69, at 16. 
77. Id., at 16-17. 
78. James W. Pennebaker and Becky L. Banasik, On the Creation and Maintenance of 
Collective Memories: History as Social Psychology, in COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF POLITICAL 
EVENTS: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 19 (James W. Pennebaker et al. eds., 
2013). 
79. Tint, supra note 63, at 241. 
80. Id., at 243. 
81. Bar-Tal, supra note 18, at 1435 (2007) (defining ‘societal beliefs’ as “cognitions 
shared by society members on topics and issues that are of special concern for their society and 
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societal beliefs of collective memory present the history of the 
conflict to society members, and create a socially constructed 
narrative that has some basis in actual events but is biased, selective, 
and distorted in ways that meet the nation’s present needs.82 
Similarly, societies in conflict may further develop a particular ‘ethos 
of conflict,’ which provides each group with a clear image of the 
conflict, its goals, and its development, as well as rigid perceptions of 
the in-group and of the enemy.83  
The combination of these collective memories, beliefs, and ethos 
creates a holistic national narrative that serves to view the in-group as 
a victim, to delegitimize the adversary, and to justify acts of violence 
and destruction toward the enemy.84 Importantly, it explains why, too 
often, communities in conflict entertain contradictory and selective 
histories of the same event, thus perpetuating the conflict.85 
C. Dissemination of Information and the Dynamic of Threatened 
National Identities 
During intractable conflicts, core information concerning the 
conflict, the actions of the in-group and the adversary, and significant 
events, is therefore institutionalized as collective memories or societal 
beliefs, and form a part of the national narrative. Therefore, 
information which is inconsistent with such identity-preserving 
beliefs threatens not only the concrete outlook concerning the relevant 
events, but also the individual’s national identity.86 In the context of 
an intractable conflict, a threat to the national identity (as long as it is 
a part of the social identity which is core to the self) typically results 
in a protective response.87 Northrup explains that to protect and 
sustain the existing beliefs, and to minimize the threat, it is likely that 
the new invalidating information will be rejected, distorted, or 
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82. Id., at 1436. 
83. Bar-Tal, supra note 18, at 1438. 
84. Id., at 1439-1441. 
85. Tint, supra note 63, at 242. 
86. Kelly terms such beliefs “core constructs.” GEORGE KELLY, A PSYCHOLOGY OF 
PERSONAL CONSTRUCTS (1955). 
87. Terrell A. Northrup, The Dynamics of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict, in 
INTRACTABLE CONFLICTS AND THEIR TRANSFORMATION 55, 66, 68 (Louis Kriesberg, Terrell 
A. Northrup, & Stuart J. Thorson eds., 1989). 
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misperceived.88 the distortion of such threatening information may 
take different forms, such as denial and rejection of the invalidating 
information as false, or redefining its content.89 Cohen terms this later 
form of distortion “interpretive denial,” where the raw facts are 
accepted, but are given a different meaning from what seems apparent 
to others.90As this process persists over time, the threatened group 
develops a rigid interpretation of the world, and increasingly 
perceives the other group as entirely different from the in-group.91  
These distortion and hardening processes account for 
stereotyping, which generally leads to depersonalization and 
dehumanization of the other group.92 The dehumanization process 
attributes ‘evil’ qualities to the other group, construes it as less than 
human, and thus makes violence against the other more tolerable 
(since it is easier to harm something or someone who is inhumane).93 
Northrup emphasizes that a part of the dehumanization process 
involves accepting less and less information about the enemy, and 
relying solely on a distorted psychological construction.94 As a result, 
each of the conflicting groups perceives the adversary to be more 
hostile than they actually are, and at the same time, perceive their own 
side as less threatening than it appears to the other party.95 
These socio-psychological processes of denial, misperception 
and misinterpretation of new information which is inconsistent with 
core societal beliefs are institutionalized in various ways: 
governmental censorship of information, use of punishments against 
providers of alternative information, control of mass media, de-
legitimization of alternative information and its sources, closure of 
archives, encouragement and reward of cultural products supporting 
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this narrative, are merely a few such examples.96 Though these 
mechanisms are most often introduced by the Government or other 
formal institutions, they also operate on the individual level.97 Self-
censorship, for example, may be practiced by a significant portion of 
society as a method of restricting the flow of information in order to 
protect the in-group.98   
In summary, the dissemination of information concerning 
controversial wartime events, in the context of intractable armed 
conflicts, is influenced by prior beliefs and national identities of its 
audiences.99 The socio-psychological infrastructure described above 
influences cognitive processes of the society members as individuals 
as well as a collective.100 It leads to a selective, biased, and distortive 
flow of information which, in essence, prevents people from 
absorbing and accepting alternative information that could have 
otherwise provided clarity about the conflict and its possible 
solutions.101 During these processes, information that threatens the 
national identity or contradicts any of its core elements may be 
misperceived or rejected, and control mechanisms may be employed – 
at both the individual and social levels – to ensure the stability and 
dominance of the national narrative.102 
D. What’s Law Got To Do With It? 
In the context of wartime investigations, legal categories are 
particularly prone to trigger threat. First, legal categories tend to rely 
on binary dichotomies and often fail to recognize ambiguous or 
complex situations.103 They require clear-cut categorization of facts 
into pre-determined bins: lawful or unlawful; guilty or not guilty; 
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combatant or civilian. This adversarial nature of legal categories may 
be perceived by disputing societies as particularly threatening of 
preconceived narratives and beliefs. That is because by their very 
nature, binary legal categories create inconsistency between the legal 
category and at least one of the conflicting narratives. For that reason, 
lawyers and legal arguments may be “better equipped for 
confrontation than for other less costly means of resolving 
disputes.”104 As a result, the adoption of binary legal categories may 
unintentionally intensify distortion, rather than assertion, of facts. 
Second, legal categories in the context of wartime investigations 
may be exceptionally threatening to core social narratives and beliefs 
because of their high cost. Legal categories represent a strong sense of 
blame and condemnation, often accompanied by severe implications. 
Specifically, classifying concrete acts into legal categories of “war 
crimes,” “crimes against humanity,” or “genocide” may backfire, as 
these are some of the most heinous crimes known to mankind, 
representing a high level of blame, social ostracism and disgust, as 
well as, at least potentially, a lifetime in prison.105 
Third, the abstract nature of legal norms may generate a 
psychological distance between the facts and their audience, thus 
making it easier to ignore the concrete circumstances or the harmed 
individuals, and to focus on the abstract legal argumentation.106 
Indeed, individual, concrete human voices, and abstract, general legal 
rules, often conflict.107 In Lowering the Bar, Marc Galanter argued 
that “[l]awyers corrupt discourse by promoting needless complexity, 
mystifying matters by jargon and formalities, robbing life’s dealings 
of their moral sense by recasting them in legal abstractions, and 
offending common sense by casuistry that makes black appear white 
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and vice versa.”108 In the context of international fact-finding during 
intractable armed conflicts, these legal abstractions and complexities 
may grab attention at the expense of the brute or physical facts. As a 
result, they may promote an adversarial approach to facts and fact-
finding more generally, attributing the argumentative nature of legal 
interpretations to the brute facts interpreted using legal lenses. 
IV. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS TO THE 
DISSEMINATION OF THE GOLDSTONE REPORT 
A. Resistance to Facts Relating to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
Within the Jewish-Israeli Society 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at its core a conflict between 
two national movements.109 It is a prototypical case of an intractable 
conflict: it is a long and violent conflict, which greatly occupies the 
society members, and is perceived as irresolvable.110 Its prolonged 
duration increases its intractability, since the current populations of 
both conflicting societies have been raised from infancy knowing 
nothing else than a perpetual state of war with the ‘other.’111 The 
intensity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is particularly high, since 
the national identities of the conflicting groups invalidate each 
other.112 In the perception of both groups is it a zero-sum conflict - 
not only with respect to territory but, most importantly, with respect 
to national identity and national existence.113 
Based on both public opinion polls and on public speeches by 
high profile politicians, Bar-Tal, Halperin, and Oren demonstrated the 
resistance of the Jewish-Israeli society to acknowledging the 
Palestinian society’s narrative. In fact, the level of resistance to the 
Palestinian narrative has grown in recent years to the point that the 
prevailing view in the Israeli society is that the West Bank is not 
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occupied (but liberated).114 Public opinion polls further demonstrate 
strong opposition among Jewish-Israelis to any attempt to recognize 
the Palestinian narrative. For example, a Peace Index poll, conducted 
in June 2009, found that 56% of the Jewish-Israeli public oppose 
Israel taking even partial responsibility for the suffering caused to the 
Palestinians by the 1948 war.115 Bar-Tal, Halperin and Oren further 
demonstrated that 79% of Jewish Israelis agreed with the statement 
that dishonesty has always characterized the Palestinians and the 
Arabs.116 Additionally, another study found that 61% of the Jewish 
Israelis agreed, at least to some extent, with the position that through 
the years of the conflict, Israel has been the victim while the Arabs 
and the Palestinians are the perpetrators.117 The construal of the out 
group – the Palestinians - as ‘evil’ have always gone hand in hand 
with the perception of the in-group - the Jewish Israelis - as victims. It 
is within this social context that the Goldstone Mission was created, 
and within which its fact-finding report was introduced. 
B. Historical Background and the Creation of the Goldstone Mission 
On December 27, 2008, Israeli Defense Forces started a twenty-
two day attack on the Gaza Strip, known as Operation Cast Lead. 
Israel described the attack as a response to constant rocket attacks 
fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel’s southern cities, causing damage 
and instilling great fear. By the operation’s end, both sides had 
suffered casualties and damage. In the southern Israeli cities, rockets 
and mortars damaged houses, schools, and cars; three Israeli civilians 
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were killed and more than a thousand were injured.118 On the 
Palestinian side, the outcome of this war was much more devastating: 
public buildings were destroyed, thousands civilians lost their homes, 
many were injured, and about 1,400 were killed.119 
While the ongoing hostilities continued, the UN Human Rights 
Council issued an urgent resolution, strongly condemning Israel for 
its “massive violations of the human rights of the Palestinian 
people,”120 and calling for an urgent international action “to put an 
immediate end to the grave violations committed by the occupying 
Power, Israel.”121 Along with these and other condemnations, the 
council also established an international fact-finding mission to 
“investigate all violations of international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law by the occupying Power, Israel, 
against the Palestinian people.”122 The President of the Council was 
authorized to appoint the mission’s members. 
Almost three months later, on April 3, 2009, the President of the 
Human Rights Council, Nigerian ambassador Martin Ihoeghian 
Uhomoibhi, appointed Justice Richard Goldstone to lead the 
mission.123 Justice Goldstone insisted upon an equal and unbiased 
mandate, however, and the mission’s mandate was changed at his 
request. The final resolution authorized the mission “to investigate all 
violations of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the 
context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during 
the period from December 27, 2008 and January 18, 2009, whether 
before, during or after.”124 
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To fulfill its duties, the Goldstone Mission conducted 188 
individual interviews. It reviewed more than 300 reports, 
submissions, and other documentation, amounting to more than 
10,000 pages, as well as over thirty videos and 1,200 photographs.125 
The methodology was based on international investigative standards 
developed by the United Nations.126 While the Palestinian authority 
and various human rights organizations fully cooperated with the 
Mission, the State of Israel chose not to participate in the proceedings, 
refused to surrender evidence or witnesses to the Mission, and 
declined the Mission’s requests to get access to either Israeli territory 
or the West Bank. 
The Report specifies that credibility determinations concerning 
the evidence collected were based on interpersonal impression of the 
witnesses that appeared before the Mission; on verification of the 
sources and the methodology used in the reports and documents 
produced by others; on cross-referencing the relevant material and 
information; and on a determination of whether, considering all the 
circumstances, there was sufficient credible and reliable information 
for the Mission to make a finding.127 Based on the abovementioned 
sources of information, in almost all of the investigated instances the 
Mission determined not only the factual findings, but also the 
corresponding legal findings (whether the acts described constitute 
international crimes).128 Finally, on September 15, 2009, the Mission 
issued its comprehensive report, concluding that some of the actions 
of the Government of Israel and of the Palestinian armed groups 
constitute war crimes and may amount to crimes against humanity.129 
C. The Immediate Aftermath of the Release of the Goldstone Report 
Following the release of the Goldstone Report, “the Israeli 
Military conducted some 400 command investigations in relation to 
Operation Cast Lead.”130 Based on these, the Israeli Military 
Advocate General has opened 52 criminal investigations into 
                                                                                                                                  
125. Id. at 15. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 16. 
129. Id. at 284, 417-19. 
130. Rep. of the Committee of Independent Experts in International Humanitarian and 
Human Rights Law Established Pursuant to Council Resolution 13/9, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/16/24, at 6 (2011) [hereinafter Rep. of the Committee of Independent Experts]. 
2018] DESIGNING INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING 365 
allegations of wrongdoing.131 Of these 52 investigations, four cases 
were submitted to prosecution, and three ended in convictions.132 One 
of these cases was a credit card theft case, and the accused soldier was 
convicted and sentenced to a prison term of seven and a half 
months.133 In another case, two soldiers were convicted of “conduct 
unbecoming” for forcing a 9-year-old Palestinian child to search bags 
suspected of being booby trapped. They were demoted and received 
suspended sentences of three months each.134 Lastly, a soldier who 
killed two Palestinian women holding a white flag reached a plea 
bargain with the military prosecution, and pled guilty to “illegal use 
of weapon” (the charge was reduced from “manslaughter”) and 
“conduct unbecoming,” and was sentenced to 45 days imprisonment 
and probation.135 
D. National Identity, Social Bias and the Goldstone Report 
The release of the Goldstone Report sparked a new battle: this 
time, between competing narratives, perceptions, and societal beliefs. 
Instantly, Israel adopted a defensive attitude and blamed the Mission 
for embracing a false, one-sided, and politically-biased viewpoint. 
The Palestinians upheld the Report as supportive of their standpoint 
(mostly ignoring the parts which accused Hamas of committing war 
crimes and crimes against humanity).136 Both sides entrenched 
themselves in their positions, and ironically, the Report itself became 
a part of the conflict. As Slater concluded, “the report has been so 
relentlessly and bitterly attacked in Israel and the United States that it 
has become toxic.”137 
Within Jewish-Israeli society, a peace-index public opinion poll 
found that among those who were familiar with the Report’s main 
findings, an overwhelming majority (93.5%) believed that the Report 
was biased against the IDF.138 Additionally, a large majority of 79% 
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rejected the Goldstone Report’s finding that during Operation Cast 
Lead the IDF committed war crimes, and considered it to be false.139 
In the Israeli Arab public only 5% rejected this finding.140 A majority 
of the Jewish public (64%) further discounted the testimonies of IDF 
soldiers who participated in Operation Cast Lead and who provided 
the Goldstone Mission with first-hand information concerning their 
experiences.141 Thus, the Jewish-Israelis discredited not only the 
Goldstone Mission, but also anyone who cooperated with it, including 
their own soldiers. 
The rejection of the Goldstone Report’s main findings was 
further strengthened by statements from senior Government officials 
who contested the Report and its findings. For example, Defense 
Minister, Ehud Barak, accused the Report of being “distorted, false, 
and irresponsible”142 and reaffirmed the core societal belief that “the 
IDF is the most moral army in the world”;143 Israel's president, 
Shimon Peres, called Goldstone “a small man, devoid of any sense of 
justice”;144 and Finance Minister, Yuval Steinitz, attacked Justice 
Goldstone Personally as an anti-Semite, and added that “we won’t let 
Jews go again like lambs to the slaughter.”145 Some Israelis put their 
opposition to the Report into action by launching various legislative 
initiatives to outlaw the activities of NGOs and individuals who 
cooperated with the Goldstone Mission, and to condemn them as 
traitors. In April 2010, for example, more than twenty Knesset 
members submitted a bill forbidding the registration of any voluntary 
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association reasonably believed to be involved in war crime lawsuits 
abroad against Israeli politicians or army officers, or to have supplied 
information to foreign bodies regarding such lawsuits. This bill would 
have applied to the transmission of such information whether true or 
false, and was initiated directly in response to the Goldstone 
Report.146 Elaborating on the various responses in Israeli society to 
the Goldstone Report, Sheizaf concluded that the Report itself became 
a symbol of identity and social affiliation: “Reject it, and you are with 
us; listen to it, acknowledge it, and you are against us.”147 
Applying the theoretical framework summarized above to the 
Jewish-Israeli society’s response to the Goldstone Report 
demonstrates the impact of legal categorizations on dissemination of 
information concerning controversial wartime events. The Goldstone 
Report introduced its factual findings by categorizing them into “war 
crimes” and “crimes against humanity” legal categories: some of the 
most heinous crimes known to mankind, representing both legal and 
moral blame.148 By doing so, the Goldstone Report threatened core 
societal beliefs within the Jewish-Israeli community, including the 
deeply rooted belief that “the IDF is the most moral army in the 
world.”149 Consistent with the Jewish-Israeli narrative, which includes 
a positive self-image and strong victimization belief,150 the popular 
Israeli perception of Operation Cast Lead saw the Israeli society as a 
victim while Hamas and the Palestinian leadership had ‘forced’ 
Israelis to kill Palestinians.151 Moreover, victimization beliefs in the 
Jewish-Israeli society extended beyond the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, to the perception of Israel as a victim of a hostile world 
which includes the Western states and international organizations 
such as the United Nations.152 These views reflect the well-
entrenched ‘siege mentality’ that characterizes the Jewish-Israeli 
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society.153 By finding that “some of the actions of the Government of 
Israel might justify a competent court finding that crimes against 
humanity have been committed,”154 the Goldstone Report threatened 
core societal beliefs engrained within the Jewish-Israeli society, 
resulting in a complete rejection of this information as false and 
biased.155 
V. REIMAGINING INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING 
The Goldstone Mission was designed and established by a 
political body - the UN Human Rights Council - to investigate 
violations of international law. Its initial mandate was one-sided, and 
its authorizing resolution had already condemned Israel for 
committing the violations it was set to investigate. This flawed 
process shadowed the work of the Mission from the start, and 
frustrated the possibility of Israeli cooperation. As a result, the 
Mission had very limited access to significant information necessary 
to establish legal conclusions. Nonetheless, the Mission followed 
through with its focus on legal categorization, and adopted the 
methodology, terminology, and structure of legal adjudication. At the 
same time, the Mission did not adopt the burden of proof required in 
criminal proceedings (in fact, it is unclear what burden of proof was 
adopted by the Mission). The focus on legal accountability - without 
the tools required to establish it - created a meaningful gap between 
the mission’s mandate, goals, processes, and its potential outcomes. 
The following Sections strive to reimagine the design process for 
international fact-finding missions, with a focus on their goals, 
processes, and structures. 
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A. Prioritizing Fact-Finding Goals and Purposes 
1. Immediate Goal: Finding the Truth   
The most basic, immediate, goal of any fact-finding mechanism 
is to ascertain facts. Nonetheless, the desire to find the truth 
necessitates making various choices and determinations, as the 
concept of truth has different meanings. The South African TRC, for 
example, developed and promoted four different aspects of truth: a 
forensic truth, focused on the objective information; a narrative truth, 
focused on the personal stories and experiences of individuals - both 
victims and perpetrators - and on creation of a united, restored 
memories; a social truth, established through interaction, discussion 
and debate; and a healing/restorative truth, enabled through public 
acknowledgment and common memories of the events.156 
Understanding, analyzing and highlighting these various aspects of 
truth enabled the commission to reconcile its main two goals - truth 
and reconciliation - and to strive to achieve them both. 
In contrast, the Goldstone Mission - similarly to many 
international fact-finding missions - focused on legal truth – ‘the truth 
in the eyes of the law’157 or the legal interpretation and meaning of 
certain physical facts.158 As the dynamics which followed the release 
of the Goldstone Report demonstrate, the adoption of contentious 
legal categories may have contributed to the wave of backlash and 
denial (due to both the insufficiency of the evidence to make 
conclusive legal determinations, and the threat these legal categories 
posed to national narratives and identities). Captured in their national 
narrative and threatened by harsh accusations that invalidate core 
societal beliefs, the Jewish-Israeli society rejected the findings of the 
Goldstone Report and entrenched in its victimization belief. 
The attribution of legal fault and blame shifted attention towards 
debates over the legal interpretation of the facts, instead of focusing 
on the brute facts (such as numbers of casualties and magnitude of 
destruction) or on individual victims and their narratives. It missed an 
opportunity to infuse the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with more 
nuanced perceptions. Any solution to this intractable, violent, conflict 
                                                                                                                                  
156. Alex Boraine, Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: The Third Way, in TRUTH 
V. JUSTICE: THE MORALITY OF THE TRUTH COMMISSIONS 141, 151-153 (Robert I. Rotberg & 
Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). 
157. Balkin, supra note 15, at, 6. 
158. Moore, supra note 15, at 25. 
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will have to include some sort of co-existence, of living together and 
of overcoming demonization and de-humanization processes. The two 
nations - the Israeli nation and the Palestinian nation - share territory 
and recourses, past and future. Unfortunately, they do not share the 
same interpretation of history and the same account of important 
events; on the contrary - their national narratives and identities 
exclude one another. Under these circumstances, rigid legal categories 
may not be the best form of fact-finding, as they may strengthen 
social biases and trigger denial and rejection. To be sure, any fact-
finding effort in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian context is likely 
to encounter resistance. Nonetheless, linking brute facts to threatening 
legal accusations is more likely to generate strong rejection. 
Importantly, facts matter. They have meaning outside the familiar 
legal categories. And this meaning should not be undermined or 
ignored by fact-finding bodies. 
Taking in mind the socio-psychological dynamics described 
above, of distortion or rejection of threatening information, the 
Goldstone Mission may have benefited from considering broader, 
more inclusive aspects of truth.159 The adversarial legal truth (which 
leads to binary dichotomies, such as ‘guilty’ or ‘not guilty’), could 
have been replaced, for example, with forensic truth, allowing to 
focus (and perhaps agree) on the brute facts, or with narrative truth, 
allowing for the coexistence of various narratives and perspectives. 
Such an approach may encourage public acknowledgment of the 
events, as well as the creation and promotion of a shared narrative.160 
By rethinking their commitment to legal categories and legal 
interpretation, fact-finding mechanisms may be able to dismantle 
some of the threat and distortion, and be better equipped to 
disseminate information. 
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2. Long Term Goals: Accountability versus Conflict Resolution 
While truth is usually the immediate goal of fact-finding, many 
times it is employed as a tool to achieve other, long-term, goals. Such 
goals include creating a historical record, encouraging domestic 
accountability, fostering reconciliation, and preventing future 
abuses.161 To develop suitable fact-finding processes that can 
maximize the efficacy of a fact-finding mission in relation to its goals, 
and to better evaluate its outcomes, the institutional goals of an 
international fact-finding mission should be organized and prioritized 
carefully.162 Unfortunately, the concrete goals of many fact-finding 
missions are not clearly defined or prioritized. 
Moreover, even when goals are mentioned in the mandating 
process they are often mixed, sometimes conflicting, as the 
fulfillment of some of these goals may impede the achievement of 
others. Such tension exists between the desire to promote 
accountability by conducting criminal trials, and the struggle for a 
peaceful change of regime;163 another tension exists between justice 
and truth, as the criminal legal process limits the permissible 
evidence.164 The documents concerning the United Nations 
Independent Investigation on Burundi (“UNIIB”), for example, 
mention several goals and purposes for the investigation, including 
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‘preventing further deterioration of the human rights situation,’ 
making recommendations ‘on the improvement of the human rights 
situation’ in Burundi, assisting reconciliation efforts, ensuring 
‘accountability for human rights violations and abuses, including by 
identifying alleged perpetrators,’ adopting ‘appropriate transitional 
justice measures,’ and issuing a final report and participating in an 
enhanced interactive dialogue on the human rights situation in 
Burundi.165 While all of these goals are valuable and important, it 
seems unlikely that a fact-finding mission could accomplish them all 
at the same time, relying on a single structure. A tension exists, for 
example, between the desire to promote accountability by identifying 
and prosecuting responsible individuals and the desire to prevent 
future abuses and to promote reconciliation, which can sometimes be 
achieved by promising powerful leaders full or partial amnesty.166 
Therefore, it is important to prioritize the goals of fact-finding 
efforts, and to choose between long-term normative goals, such as 
justice or accountability, and pragmatic objectives such as stopping 
the violence or managing (or even resolving) the conflict.167 Taking in 
mind the complexity of some conflicts, international fact-finding 
missions should not be limited to goals of adjudication and 
accountability. While international criminal tribunals ought to be 
supported by certain fact-finding mechanisms, not all international 
fact-finding mechanisms should be designed in their shadow. This is 
especially true with regard to ongoing violent conflicts, such as the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which can benefit from efforts to infuse 
the conflict with new perspectives and information. Socio-
psychological research has thus far demonstrated that third parties - 
such as international fact-finding mechanisms - can potentially play a 
valuable role in the process of re-evaluating social narratives and 
beliefs.168  
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3. Institutional goals: reputation, legitimacy, and compliance  
The reputation of the fact-finding body is determined by its 
perceived independence, impartiality, effectiveness and legitimacy. 
This last indicator is especially important, as a fact-finding mission’s 
ability to attain its goals largely depends on its perceived legitimacy 
in the eyes of key constituencies.169 Legitimacy is, fundamentally, a 
collective process. It depends on apparent consensus among the 
relevant actors, accepting the object - in our case, the fact-finding 
mission - as legitimate.170 In international justice thus far, the most 
well-known structures - including fact-finding missions - have been 
designed by international elite.171 This top-down designing process 
creates a dual legitimacy deficit: first, it distances the relevant 
societies from the fact-finding body, and diminishes its capacity to 
harness domestic institutions to promote its objectives and implement 
its outputs. Second, it challenges the structural independence of the 
fact-finding body, as it subjects the decision-making process to the 
political agenda and balance of power of the international 
community.172 Therefore, while designing international fact-finding 
bodies, it is important to think not only about the goals, processes and 
structures, but also about the identity of the mandate provider and its 
perceived or actual political ties. 
The Goldstone Mission was established by the UN Human 
Rights Council, an international body infamous for its political anti-
Israeli agenda, which prompted both the former and the current UN 
Secretary-Generals to strongly criticize the Council’s anti-Israeli 
focus.173 Moreover, the resolution establishing the Mission already 
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determined that Israel is responsible for massive violations against the 
Palestinian people.174 Similarly, the Mission’s mandate was severely 
flawed, and had to be revised by Justice Goldstone himself. The 
identity of the establishing institution, the initial one-sided mandate 
and the language of the establishing resolution, created a significant 
legitimacy deficit, at least in the eyes of the Jewish-Israeli society. 
Consequently, it frustrated Israeli cooperation with the Mission, and 
triggered bias towards its findings even before it embarked on its 
mission. 
What can be done to enhance the legitimacy of fact-finding 
bodies – and thus improve the level of acceptance of their findings 
and recommendations? In their book Trust in the Law, Taylor and 
Huo find that acceptance of legal decisions increases when people 
regard the agents of the legal system as acting in a way they perceive 
to be fair and trustworthy.175 In a study focused on police legitimacy, 
Tyler demonstrates how perceived fairness of the institution’s 
procedures influences evaluations of legitimacy.176 He finds, that 
when authorities act in ways that people experience as being fair, 
people are more willing to voluntarily accept the authorities’ 
decisions.177 Tylor makes several recommendations to increase the 
procedural fairness – and legitimacy - of an organization:178 first, 
enhance participation - people are more satisfied with procedures that 
allow them to participate by explaining their situations and 
communicating their views. Participation is especially important for 
international fact-finding institutions lacking binding force or 
enforcement capabilities. To enhance participation, it is important to 
first identify all of the relevant stakeholders, and to invite them to 
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participate in the process.179 Second, after all potential participants 
have been identified, one way to motivate them to participate is by 
enhancing structural flexibility - the possibility of modifying fact-
finding structures or procedures in response to changing needs or 
circumstances - and by offering a menu of processes and structures to 
choose from, as different processes entail diverse incentives for the 
relevant parties.180 Third, objectivity - people think that decisions are 
being more fairly made when authorities are unbiased and make their 
decisions using objective indicators, not personal views. Fourth, 
improve quality of interpersonal treatment - people value being 
treated with dignity and respect by authorities. Fifth, trustworthiness - 
people feel that procedures are fairer when they trust the motives of 
decision makers. 
Returning to the Goldstone Mission, legitimacy and legitimacy-
enhancing techniques were not factored into the design of the 
Mission, nor did they influence its fact-finding structures and 
processes later on. In fact, all five aspects identified by Taylor as 
enhancing legitimacy were not considered by the UN Human Rights 
Council, and ultimately contributed to the backlash against the 
Mission’s findings. While this was consistent with its general 
approach, which did not see the Jewish-Israeli society as its intended 
audience, it nonetheless sustained the international controversy 
concerning the Report and its findings. 
First, with regard to participation - the legal focus required 
access to information held by Israel. To make credible legal 
conclusions, the Mission had to review information concerning 
military decision-making processes, including the knowledge and 
intent of the alleged perpetrators. Therefore, to achieve this goal, 
methods to enhance participation should have been seriously and 
creatively considered. To enhance the legitimacy of the fact-finding 
mission and the facts it produces - given partial participation - 
international fact-finding may benefit from focusing on non-legal 
truth, as suggested above, while leaving the legal interpretation of the 
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facts to competent courts or tribunals which may be better equipped 
to summon witnesses and collect evidence. By emphasizing the 
importance of participation I do not suggest that a refusal to 
participate in the fact-finding process should have frustrated any 
attempt to establish the truth; but it is important to be aware of the 
limitations that a participation gap imposes on the fact-finding 
process. Second, with regard to structural flexibility - the Israeli 
refusal to cooperate with the Mission should have prompt a discussion 
of alternative processes that may be adopted instead, in an effort to 
enhance the Mission’s legitimacy and thus increase the potential 
impact of its findings. As with the discussion of the participation 
element, structural flexibility would have required focusing on the 
elements that were in the control of the Mission, such as recording 
witness’ testimonies and focusing on brute facts. Third, the perceived 
objectivity of the Mission by its Jewish-Israeli audience was doomed 
from the start, in part, due to the politicized nature of its founding 
body, the UNHCR. Consequently, the perceived bias of the founding 
institution tainted the further elements of trustworthiness of the fact-
finders and their interpersonal skills, and turned the de-legitimation of 
the Mission to a national task in Israel and a test of loyalty and social 
belonging. 
B. Matching goals with processes in international fact-finding 
As discussed above, international fact-finding missions – as any 
other international institution - may be established to fulfill an array 
of goals and purposes. However, the structure and processes adopted 
by international fact-finding missions in recent years have been quite 
uniform, focusing on legal categories and legal violations framework 
to collect, interpret and produce facts. A possible explanation for this 
uniformity is that their mandates are often crafted hastily, while 
atrocities are ongoing, without identifying and prioritizing concrete 
goals.181 A lack of clarity concerning the mission’s goals may 
motivate the adoption of existing or familiar processes and structures, 
without proper consideration of the appropriateness of these structures 
to achieve the desired goals, or the existence of alternative structures. 
Therefore, while designing international fact-finding missions, 
the mandating institution should define, clarify, and prioritize the 
goals and purposes of this mission. Based on the mission’s main 
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goals, alternative processes and structures should be considered, 
matching goals to processes in order to maximize the mission’s 
efficacy. Instead of adopting a ‘one size fits all’ approach, 
international fact-finding would benefit from careful consideration of 
alternative processes and structures, and from a learned process of 
tailoring concrete processes and structures to specific goals. 
The analysis of the Goldstone Mission suggests that a mismatch 
existed between the main goal of the Mission – investigating 
violations of international law – and the structure of the Mission, 
which had no enforcement capabilities and had to rely on voluntary 
cooperation from the relevant stakeholders to get access to 
information. No cooperation meant partial data, and partial data 
meant legal findings that rest upon unsatisfactory evidence. One 
particular example from the Goldstone Report demonstrates the 
implications of this mismatch between goals and processes. 
One of the incidents the Goldstone Report focused on was the 
shelling of the Al-Samouni family house. The Report determined, 
based on testimonies by family members and eyewitnesses, that on 
January 5, 2009, around 6:30-7:00 a.m., Israeli forces fired several 
projectiles at the Al-Samouni family house, located at Zeytoun area, 
south of Gaza city. The first two projectiles were fired at five men 
who stepped outside to bring firewood. Immediately after this initial 
attack, additional projectiles destroyed the house, were dozens of 
unarmed civilians took shelter, under explicit orders from IDF 
soldiers (who denied their pleas to leave the area and ordered them 
back into the house). As a result of the shelling, twenty-one family 
members were killed, and nineteen were injured.182 
Israel refused to cooperate with the Mission and did not provide 
any information concerning its military operations. Therefore, the 
Goldstone Mission did not have evidence concerning the military 
decision-making process, the reasons for the shelling, and the 
knowledge and intent of those who ordered the attack. Nonetheless, 
the Mission did not stop here, with the factual findings concerning 
this incident, and moved on to determine the legal categories for these 
actions. The Mission members found that the attack on the Al-
Samouni house was “a direct intentional attack against civilian 
population” which may constitute a crime against humanity.183 
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In response, Israeli military authorities rejected this description 
altogether. A military investigation opened following the release of 
the Goldstone Report found that the brigade commander’s order to 
bomb the Al-Samouni house was based on erroneous – yet legitimate 
– interpretation of drone photos shown in the war room, in which the 
men holding firewood seemed as terrorists holding RPG rockets.184 In 
May 2012, the military prosecution announced that no legal steps will 
be taken against those responsible for the shelling of the Al-Samouni 
house,185 as the killing of the Al-Samouni family members was not 
done knowingly and directly, or out of haste and negligence, in a 
manner that would indicate criminal responsibility.186 In between, 
while the Israeli military investigation was still ongoing, Justice 
Richard Goldstone published an op-ed in the Washington Post, in 
which he specifically retracted from the Goldstone Report’s legal 
findings concerning the Al-Samouni incident. In his op-ed, Justice 
Goldstone stated that the shelling of the Al-Samouni home “was 
apparently the consequence of an Israeli commander’s erroneous 
interpretation of a drone image,” and that “if I had known then what I 
know now, the Goldstone Report would have been a different 
document.”187 Goldstone’s op-ed was vindicated by Israel as a proof 
that the Goldstone Report – including its factual findings – was biased 
and false, and that the IDF operates according to international law 
generally, and particularly in the shelling of the Al-Samouni house.188 
The Al-Samouni controversy demonstrates the importance of 
adopting fact-finding processes and structures that are consistent with 
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the main goal of the fact-finding institution. The legal categorization 
approach adopted by the Goldstone Mission is suitable for advancing 
legal accountability goals, but must rest on fact-finding processes that 
provide the evidence necessary to make legal conclusions. In the 
Goldstone Mission’s case, without guaranteeing Israel’s cooperation 
or external enforcement capacities that would result in gathering the 
required evidence, the legal conclusions rested on insufficient 
evidence. As a result, even Goldstone himself later retracted from the 
legal conclusions determined by the Report, in a way that robbed the 
brute facts from their independent meaning and significance. Israeli 
military did shell a house where numerous people, including infants, 
children, and elderly, took shelter. As a result, twenty-one family 
members were killed and many others injured. These facts should 
have been at the center of attention. Instead, the focus on binary legal 
categories turned the accusations on their head, reasserting that the 
IDF is indeed the most moral army in the world. The insufficiency of 
the evidence for attributing legal blame and responsibility projected 
on the factual findings as well – even though these were based on 
appropriate evidence. Goldstone apologized to Israel over the opinion 
pages of the Washington Post. Who will apologize to the Al-Samouni 
survivors? 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Through the glasses of Israeli national identity, Operation Cast 
Lead was nothing but a justified and necessary reaction to monstrous 
Palestinian terrorism. In contrast, the Goldstone Report accused Israel 
with committing atrocious international crimes against innocent 
civilians. The Report’s focus on binary legal categories intensified 
Israelis’ defensive response aimed at protecting and preserving their 
national narrative. At the same time, it shifted attention from the brute 
facts - the sounds and images, the voices and faces, the dust, ruins, 
hunger, blood and tears - to sophisticated and abstract debates over 
legal interpretations and definitions.  
Truth is comprised of various layers of information and is 
subjected to different social perceptions and interpretations. During 
armed conflicts, many factors join-in to escalate conflicting 
assessments of “what really happened.” Information that threatens 
core societal beliefs triggers defensive reactions and might be 
distorted to fit the national narrative. This socio-psychological 
dynamic presents a unique challenge to the dissemination of 
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international fact-finding reports during intractable armed conflicts. In 
order to overcome this challenge and to improve the positive effects 
of international fact-finding efforts, fact-finding missions should be 
carefully and thoughtfully designed. 
First, the mechanism’s goals should be clearly defined and 
prioritized. The immediate goal of finding the truth and determining 
‘what really happened’ should not be jeopardized by or secondary to 
long terms goals such as accountability or reconciliation. With regard 
to long-term goals, the traditional goal of accountability should not 
overshadow other important goals, such as conflict resolution and 
reconciliation. This is especially true with regard to intractable armed 
conflicts, which can benefit from efforts to infuse the conflict with 
new dynamics, perspectives and information. Additionally, 
institutional goals, such as legitimacy, trust and participation, should 
also be considered and enhanced in order to improve their positive 
impact and mitigate backlash and resistance. Once its main goal is 
clearly defined, fact-finding processes could – and should - be 
tailored to the concrete goal of the fact-finding mission. The 
enforcement deficit of some fact-finding mechanisms, such as the 
Goldstone Mission, requires processes that highlight participation and 
cooperation. 
Second, adversarial legal truth should not dominate international 
fact-finding efforts. Legal truth is not the only truth, and legal blame 
may be counterproductive when it comes to preventing future 
atrocities and mobilizing institutional change within inflexible 
military organizations. There are other types of knowledge, which 
may be less threatening than legal truth, and more sensitive to the 
nuances of complex situations. By relinquishing legal categorization 
and interpretation of facts, along with its inherent attribution of blame 
and fault, fact-finding missions may be able to dismantle some the 
threat and distortion, and thus improve the dissemination of their 
findings by the conflicting groups. 
Finally, in this era of constant challenges to knowledge and 
information, where ‘alternative facts’ are frequently produced to 
counter unwelcomed information, and when critical findings are 
denounced as ‘fake news’, the outputs of international fact-fining 
missions are particularly sensitive to competing findings. Therefore, 
international fact-finding missions should be sensitive to the various 
contingencies of their findings, and adopt a humbler approach 
concerning the ‘indisputable’ nature of these findings. Instead of 
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serving as a cheap substitute (politically and financially) to 
international adjudication, fact-finding missions may creatively 
contribute to dissemination of threatening information during 
intractable conflicts in a way that is unattainable by existing legal 
institutions. If designed thoughtfully, international fact-finding 
missions may encourage conflicting societies to re-evaluate some of 
their core societal beliefs, and accept new information concerning the 
conflict, their adversaries and perhaps even their own actions. 
  
382 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:337 
 
 
